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I. Introduction  
 
For the fourth time in the past decade, the D.C. Circuit is considering the Federal 
Communications Commission's regulation of broadband network management practices.
1
 And 
while the case is captioned Mozilla v. FCC, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have 
joined the petition for review. Their participation highlights an important aspect of the case not 
foreseen by most pundits when the Commission's Restoring Internet Freedom Order ("RIF 
Order") was adopted: whether policymakers may reimpose at the state level regulations repealed 
by the federal government. 
 
The RIF Order expressly preempted state efforts to regulate net neutrality, and the states in turn 
have challenged this provision.
2
 If upheld, the RIF Order's preemption provision likely dooms 
most state net neutrality initiatives. But importantly, even if the court rejects the agency's express 
preemption arguments, conflict preemption principles are likely to invalidate state efforts that 
upset the carefully-crafted policy balance exhibited in the Commission's order. 
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II. State Net Neutrality Efforts and Express Preemption 
 
Following the adoption of the RIF Order, several states took steps to recreate net neutrality 
restrictions that the agency had repealed. At least six governors adopted some form of restriction 
by executive order, which require broadband providers to adhere to net-neutral principles as a 
condition of doing business with the state.
3
 Four others have enacted legislation to regulate 
broadband providers directly.
4
 The most aggressive of these statutes, California, extends beyond 
the now-defunct Open Internet Order's prohibition on blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization, to regulate zero-rating and interconnection agreements.  
 
But the RIF Order contains a preemption provision. Like the 2015 Open Internet Order that it 
replaced, the RIF Order expressly preempts "any state or local measures that would effectively 
impose rules or requirements" that the order repealed or rules that would otherwise be 
"inconsistent with the federal deregulatory approach" taken in the order.
5
 Specifically, the order 
preempts "any so-called' economic'  or 'public utility-type regulations, including common-
carriage requirements akin to those found in Title II" of the Communications Act.
6
 Notably, it 
also contains a savings clause: the order "do[es] not disturb or displace the states' traditional role 
in generally policing such matters as fraud, taxation, and general commercial dealings, so long as 
the administration of such general state laws does not interfere with federal regulatory 
objectives."
7
 
 
The RIF Order's preemption provision reflects the Commission's long-standing "policy of 
nonregulation to ensure that Internet applications remain insulated from unnecessary and harmful 
economic regulation at both the federal and state levels."
8
 In 2004, at the dawn of the Internet 
age, the agency formally preempted any state regulation of information services that would 
"conflict with our policy of nonregulation."
9
 It grounded this approach in its Bell-era policy that 
"enhanced services would continue to develop best in an unregulated environment" and 
explained that the 1996 Telecommunications Act "increases substantially the likelihood that any 
state attempt to impose economic regulation" would conflict with this policy.
10
 As Free State 
Foundation Senior Fellow Seth Cooper noted in an earlier FSF Perspectives,
11
 the Eighth Circuit 
upheld this policy in 2007, explaining that "deregulation" is a "valid interest[] the FCC may 
protect through preemption of state regulation."
12
 The same court reiterated this conclusion last 
year, holding that "'any state regulation of an information service conflicts with the federal policy 
of nonregulation,' so that such regulation is preempted by federal law."
13
 
 
The Mozilla petitioners nevertheless argue that the order's preemption provision is invalid. Their 
argument is that the Commission has interpreted the Communications Act to prevent the agency 
from regulating broadband service. The RIF Order disclaims authority to regulate broadband 
under Title II, and petitioners argue that the agency failed to identify a jurisdictional hook upon 
which to hang Title I ancillary authority. Because the Commission found that it lacked authority 
to regulate broadband, petitioners argue, it similarly lacks authority to preempt state regulation. 
 
The agency responds that under the Communications Act, broadband access is an interstate 
service that should be subject to one uniform federal regulatory regime rather than a patchwork 
of state regulations. Reiterating the justifications cited in the RIF Order, the Commission argues 
that under Section 2 of the Act, the Commission may preempt state law when it is impossible or 
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impracticable to regulate the intrastate portion of a service without affecting the interstate 
component.
14
 It also relies on the policy of nonregulation of information services discussed 
above. 
 
Petitioners' anti-preemption argument is clever, and it may succeed in defeating the specific 
bases for preemption cited in the order. But while this argument might insulate states from 
express preemption, ultimately it misunderstands the full import of the Restoring Internet 
Freedom Order. When the Commission's action is properly understood, one realizes that the 
agency need not rely on express preemption alone because as explained below, most, if not all, 
state net neutrality regulations fail under principles of conflict preemption. 
 
III. State Net Neutrality Efforts and Conflict Preemption 
  
Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible for a party to comply with state and federal 
law, or when state law interferes with the accomplishment of a federal objective.
15
 Most state net 
neutrality laws fall in the latter category. As the Commission alludes to in its appellate brief, the 
RIF Order is best understood as an exercise of the agency's judgment regarding federal policy 
objectives. The Commission chose one regulatory design from a wide range of potential options 
available under the Act. In the Brand X decision,
16
 the Supreme Court held that the 
Telecommunications Act's definitional constructs were ambiguous, and therefore the 
Commission was free to classify broadband Internet access service as either a Title I information 
service or a Title II telecommunications service. Moreover, the agency has authority to regulate 
information services under its ancillary authority to regulate interstate communications by wire 
or radio, as long as that regulation is related to the performance of a statutory objective. And it 
has authority to forebear from applying particular provisions of Title II.  
 
Legally, this flexibility creates a wide range of potential broadband regulatory schemes, all of 
which are permissible under the Communications Act as interpreted by Brand X. On one end of 
the spectrum, it could opt for a policy of complete nonregulation. On the other end, it could 
apply the full panoply of common carriage obligations under Title II. In between are a variety of 
potential bundles of either Title I or Title II-lite regulatory regimes. 
 
The RIF Order represents the agency's policy judgment regarding the optimal regulatory bundle 
from among these options. Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Commission did not completely 
foreswear any jurisdiction over broadband access. Rather, the agency opted to classify broadband 
as an information service and subject it to extensive transparency and disclosure obligations. But 
it decided against more intensive common carrier-like economic restrictions, because in its 
judgment, general consumer protection and antitrust remedies provide adequate protection for 
consumers and more intrusive regulations could have adverse effects on consumers and 
innovation. 
 
State net neutrality efforts would upset this carefully-calibrated federal regulatory scheme. 
California, for example, would make the following practices unlawful: 
 
 Blocking lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful devices, 
subject to reasonable network management; 
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 Impairing or degrading lawful Internet traffic on the basis of Internet 
content, application, or service, or use of a nonharmful device, subject to 
reasonable network management; 
 Requiring consideration, monetary or otherwise, from an edge provider; 
 Engaging in paid prioritization; 
 Engaging in zero-rating for consideration; 
 Zero-rating some Internet content, applications, services, or devices in a 
category, but not the entire category; 
 Unreasonably interfering with, or unreasonably disadvantaging, an end 
user's ability to select, access, and use broadband Internet access service 
or the lawful Internet content, applications, services, or devices of the end 
user's choice, or an edge provider's ability to make lawful content, 
applications, services, or devices available to end users. 
 
Some of these prohibitions were contained in the Obama-era Open Internet Order, but were 
explicitly repealed by the RIF Order for reasons that the Commission took great pains to explain 
and justify. Others are prohibitions that even the Open Internet Order chose not to adopt, again 
for good reason. By imposing obligations that the agency explicitly chose to repeal, California 
and other states interfere with the RIF Order's careful balance of regulatory obligations and 
freedoms. 
 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has stated clearly and repeatedly that the Supremacy Clause 
preempts state laws that "frustrate the accomplishment of a federal objective."
17
 Where, as here, 
an agency has adopted a "careful regulatory scheme" that balances trade-offs between more and 
less onerous requirements, states may not upset that balance. This case is analogous to Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Company.
18
 To promote greater highway safety, the Department of 
Transportation adopted a regulation requiring auto manufacturers to equip some, but not all, of 
their vehicles with passive restraints such as airbags.
19
 The standard deliberately sought a mix of 
different restraints to be phased in over time, and rejected an all-airbag standard because of 
concerns about public backlash.
20
 The plaintiff, injured in an automobile crash, alleged that 
failure to provide an airbag violated state tort law despite being in compliance with the federal 
standard. But the court found the state tort claim was preempted, because a "rule of state tort law 
imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as petitioners' would have presented an obstacle to 
the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought and to the phase-in that the 
federal regulation deliberately imposed."
21
 
 
Significantly, this conflict preemption does not depend upon the existence of an express 
preemption clause. The regulatory scheme in Geier included a provision expressly preempting 
inconsistent state safety standards.
22
 The court held this express clause was inapplicable to 
Geier's suit because a tort action is not a safety standard.
23
 But it explained that the existence of 
an inapplicable preemption provision, "by itself, does not foreclose (through negative 
implication) "'any possibility of implied [conflict] pre-emption.'"
24
 Similarly, even if the Mozilla 
court invalidates the RIF Order's express preemption provision, individual state net neutrality 
efforts would be subject to a conflict preemption analysis—a fact that the state petitioners 
conceded at oral argument. 
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Moreover, when conducting this analysis, the court will give weight to the agency's own views 
regarding when state initiatives conflict with the federal objective in question. As the Supreme 
Court explained, "[t]he agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation 
and its objectives and is 'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely impact of state 
requirements."
25
 Here, the RIF Order clarified that "common-carriage requirements akin to those 
found in Title II," as well as any other obligation equivalent to "rules or requirements that we 
repeal or refrain from imposing today," would "pose an obstacle to or place an undue burden on 
the provision of broadband Internet access service" and would there "conflict with the 
deregulatory approach we adopt today."
26
 "In these circumstances," held the Geier Court, "the 
agency's own views should make a difference."
27
 
 
Nor can states avoid preemption by substituting the power of the purse for the power to regulate 
directly, as various executive orders seek to do. While a state may perhaps attach conditions to 
services that it purchases for its own use, "courts have found preemption when government 
entities seek to advance general societal goals rather than narrow proprietary interests through 
the use of their contracting power."
28
 For example, the Supreme Court preempted a Wisconsin 
statute that prohibited the state from contracting with certain repeat violators of the National 
Labor Relations Act, on the ground that the additional penalty increased, and therefore conflicted 
with, the remedial scheme provided under the Act; the Court found it immaterial that "Wisconsin 
has chosen to use its spending power rather than its police power."
29
  
 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council is also instructive.
30
 In the late 1990s, the federal 
government enacted a measured set of economic sanctions against Burma.
31
 Massachusetts 
enacted its own statute that prohibited the state from contracting with companies that did 
business with Burma, even if those companies were in compliance with the federal regime.
32
 
Like the net neutrality executive orders, the goal was to put pressure on companies to adopt 
voluntary practices that federal law refused to impose directly. Yet the Court unanimously 
preempted the Massachusetts law because it "conflicts with federal law at a number of points by 
penalizing individuals and conduct that Congress has explicitly exempted or excluded from 
sanctions" in "clear contrast to the congressional scheme."
33
  
 
It is possible that the Mozilla court will refrain from making a blanket determination about 
conflict preemption between the RIF Order and various state net neutrality initiatives. After all, 
conflict preemption typically requires a finding that the state rule actually conflicts with, or poses 
an obstacle to, a federal objective. The court may prefer not to make this determination in the 
abstract, instead deferring until faced with an actual conflict with a specific state statute. But this 
means that even if the states succeed in striking down the express preemption provision, the 
Commission or affected parties may nonetheless challenge individual state net neutrality 
initiatives on conflict preemption grounds – and, as noted above, the state petitioners conceded 
as much.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Unquestionably, state regulators historically have played an important role in communications 
regulation. But unlike telephone communication, which can be neatly segmented into intrastate 
and interstate components, broadband is inherently an interstate service. As the latter replaced 
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the former as America's primary communications network over the past two decades, state 
regulators transitioned to a less active role. 
 
The reassertion of state authority in the past year was not driven by regulatory necessity, but by 
politics. But political disagreements alone cannot change the nature of the regulatory 
environment governing broadband. As the RIF Order notes, states will continue to play a role in 
broadband regulation by enforcing general consumer protection laws alongside the FCC and the 
Federal Trade Commission. But preemption doctrines rightly prevent the states from balkanizing 
the Internet, according to the dictates of multiple regulatory regimes, in ways that interfere with 
the judgments of the federal government's primary communications regulatory agency.  
 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, an Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a Member 
of the Free State Foundation's Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an 
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